Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 33

Issue 1

Article 1

September 2021

Qualifying a Public Health Emergency as "A Threat to International
Peace and Security" and COVID-19: The Practice of the UN
Security Council Revisited
Gregor Maucec

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Maucec, Gregor (2021) "Qualifying a Public Health Emergency as "A Threat to International Peace and
Security" and COVID-19: The Practice of the UN Security Council Revisited," Florida Journal of
International Law: Vol. 33: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol33/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Maucec: Qualifying a Public Health Emergency as "A Threat to Internationa

QUALIFYING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY AS "A
THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY" AND
COVID-19: THE PRACTICE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
REVISITED
Gregor Maucec*
Abstract**

.

This Article provides an analytical framework designed to assess
whether a public health emergency constitutes a threat to international
peace and security. In so doing, it challenges a common observation that
the UN Security Council (UNSC) is largely free to frame public health
issues of global concern as threats to international security. This Article
instead argues that, for legitimacy and compliance purposes, the UNSC
needs to establish that several determining criteria have been met before
it can characterize a public health crisis as a threat to international
security. Against this backdrop, this Article discusses a number of
parameters which can be relied on in deciding whether or not to turn a
public health event such as a global pandemic into a security issue at the
international level. It then applies these determining criteria to the
COVID-19 crisis to show that the UNSC, by failing to promptly and
adequately react, betrayed its goal. This Article accordingly argues for a
more coherent decision-making practice and rigorous reasoning of the
UNSC. Such a more focused approach presupposes that certain
qualifying criteria must be met to normatively justify and legitimize the
characterization of a public health crisis as a threat to international
security, thus enhancing the perceived fairness of the UNSC's decisions.
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INTRODUCTION

Infectious disease outbreaks over the last two decades-most notably,
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS), Avian Influenza H5N1, the pandemic influenza
clearly
H1N1 (swine flu), Zika virus, and Ebola virus -have
with a
crises
health
regional
of
consequences
demonstrated devastating
pandemic
a
of
dangers
The
range of international security implications.
have become a dire reality and have given rise to pressing security
concerns globally. 1
The recent outbreak of coronavirus disease COVID-19 and its rapid
spread to virtually all parts of the world epitomizes how new diseases can
in no time become global (economic and social) threats to all humankind.
More alarmingly, it has shown the devastating and deadly effects of the
appearance of a new virulent pandemic disease, especially in poor
On a security dimension of the international protection against pandemic threats, see
Vanja Rokvic & Zoran Jeftid, Health Issues as Security Issues, 67 VoiNO DELO 53 (2015).

1.
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countries with no effective healthcare system. In the international
community, there is a limited range of recognized health security threats,
including infectious diseases and bioterrorism. While there can be two
main sources of public health emergencies-naturally occurring
infectious diseases (either familiar, or new and mysterious ones) and
manmade disease outbreaks-this Article is mainly concerned with the
former.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) has the central role in coordinating
the global response to infectious diseases posing threats to international
peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter. 2
Such a coordination of an international response may include using
sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 3 Indeed, if the UNSC is
to contribute to addressing public health threats preventively, it must act
at a sufficiently early stage and respond as robustly as to other global
threats. In such situations, it needs to quickly act by either supporting the
World Health Organization's (WHO) work on the matter or taking over
direct responsibility for the coordinated international response to a public
health emergency. It also needs to promptly decide what type of
collective action the outbreak of an infectious disease necessitates-for
example, establishing a sanitary cordon or quarantine measures in cases
of extreme public health threat, or enforcement of trade and travel
recommendations.
In the case of communicable disease outbreaks, however, the
executive organ of the UN has largely adopted an unprincipled approach.
It has only on one occasion declared a highly infectious disease a threat
to international peace and security: the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in
West Africa. 4 On the other hand, the UNSC's response to some other
evolving public health crises, including the most recent COVID-19
pandemic, has been shockingly slow, underresourced and anemic. In
particular, the UNSC's immediate and rapid reaction to these
epidemic/pandemic outbreaks in terms of early preventive action, based
on good reporting and adequate capacities throughout the UN system,
could have strengthened existing mechanisms for timely and effective
international cooperation. For example, using its powers under Article 24
of the UN Charter, the UNSC could have appealed to a broad range of

2. U.N. Charter art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.").
3. U.N. Charter ch. VII (Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression).

4. S.C. Res. 2177 (Sept. 18, 2014).
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actors and resources, which could have then been streamlined towards
5
the WHO and its mandate.
As a critique of such an ad hoc, selective and "uneven approach by
the [UNSC]," 6 this Article challenges a common observation that the
UNSC is largely free to frame public health issues of global concern as
threats to international peace and security. It instead argues that, for
legitimacy and compliance purposes, the UNSC needs to establish that
several determining criteria have been met before it can characterize a
public health crisis as a threat to international peace and security.
Whereas the UNSC "is not bound to use uniform criteria in seemingly
similar situations," 7 it should strive to clearly define the substantive
conditions that must be present for a public health emergency to qualify
as a threat to international peace and security for two main reasons.
First, examining these criteria would help the UNSC quickly ascertain
the gravity and scope of a public health crisis, as well as the nature of a
threat and its overall potential impact on international peace and security,
thus enabling the UNSC to respond in as prompt, appropriate, and
efficient a manner as possible. In particular, the UNSC's decision-making
would significantly benefit from making a full evaluation of a public
health issue based on a set of objective criteria, so as to quickly proceed
with qualifying such an event or its continuation as a threat to
international peace and security and decide on the measures to be
implemented by the UN member states. This would allow for the UNSC
to arrive at necessary conclusions in public health emergency situations
quickly.
In this way, the UNSC could better fulfil its primary mission of acting
as a quick and effective global response mechanism to curb and control
the global spread of disease, and to prevent the pandemic's escalation,
continuation, and recurrence. This would help to bridge the time gap
between the appearance of an immediate risk of public health emergency,
or an actual infectious disease outbreak, and the UNSC's urgent and
united response to the existing public health crisis-an old problem that
has once again come to the fore in case of the COVID-19 pandemic. No
doubt, this kind of global response would demonstrate the additional
value and relevance of the UNSC in these troubled times, thus countering
common criticisms that the existing model of collective security is no
longer fit for purpose.
5. Armin von Bogdandy & Pedro A. Villarreal, InternationalLaw on Pandemic Response:
Research
A FirstStocktaking in Light of the Coronavirus Crisis 22-23 (Max Planck Inst., MPIL

Paper Series,

Working

Paper No.

2020-07,

2020), https://ssm.com/abstract-3561650

[https://perma.cc/2KNR-DCPM].

6. Id. at 23.

the
7. Karel Wellens, The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to

Future, 8 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 15, 47 (2003).
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Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, pursuing such guiding
and objective, though not binding, principles would help ensure a more
coherent and universal human-centered decision-making practice of the
UNSC in this subject area. In so doing, the UNSC would gradually move
away from its current arbitrary practice of proceeding on a case-by-case
basis when it comes to determining whether or not a public health issue
constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Consequently,
having identified a public health issue as falling under its responsibility,
the UNSC would be expected to regularly and consistently assess a public
health crisis against the provided criteria (objectively defined) when
considering whether it should be qualified as a threat to international
peace and security. This would lead to a greater certainty and
foreseeability of its decisions with well-reasoned justifications, thus
enhancing the overall legitimacy and authority of the organ.
The UNSC has to consider elements in order to qualify a public health
crisis as a threat to international peace and security, Certain objective
criteria serving as main qualifiers in discerning and declaring public
health emergencies (and other similar events) as (latent) threats to
international peace and security may provide the UNSC with some
guidance for the future. Moreover, observing such threshold criteria is
still in line with the UNSC's determination not to prejudice its ability "to
respond to situations on a case-by-case basis" and "to respond rapidly and
flexibly as circumstances require." 8 The inevitable case-by-case approach
does not prevent the identification of some guiding criteria or parameters
in the reasons and causes which have given rise to the UNSC's
pronouncements or determinations. In fact, qualifying a public health
issue as a threat to international peace and security against these criteria
would facilitate such an approach of the UNSC.
It has been argued that the willingness of the UNSC members to
expand the parameters of Article 39 of the UN Charter "may lead to a
situation where it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern any objective
criteria for determining what constitutes a threat to the peace." Similarly,
according to W. Michael Reisman, "[finding criteria to be applied .. . is
not easy"' 0 and "Chapter VII is . .. open-textured."' Thus, "'a threat to
the peace' is, and was obviously designed to be, subjectively
determined." 12

8. S.C. Pres. Statement 1994/22 (May 3, 1994).
9. Anna Hood, Ebola: A Threat to the Parametersof a Threat to the Peace?, 16 MELB. J.
INT'L L. 29, 50 (2015).
10. W. Michael Reisman, The ConstitutionalCrisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 83, 93 (1993).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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While these statements may well be true, they should not stand in the
way or discourage us from our attempts to establish some objective
criteria. On the contrary, as Thomas M. Franck noted, the legitimacy of
the UN system of delegation of limited sovereign powers to the UNSC
requires open, "visible and effective checks on unsupportable
aggrandizement by the Council." 13 Indeed, providing a conceptual
framework with certain parameters for understanding and framing public
health threats as international security issues would definitely contribute
to such greater transparency of the UNSC's decisions in determining
whether or not a threat to international peace and security exists.
At the same time, it would help us to better understand under what
circumstances the UNSC could justifiably authorize the use of
recommendations and, when necessary, coercive measures under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter in the context of public health emergencies "as a
14
matter of good conscience and good sense." Against this backdrop, the
purpose of this Article is to identify and explain such baseline criteria for
determining whether a public health emergency constitutes a threat to
international peace and security.
Underlying the treatment of the subject matter are two core questions:
What criteria, if there can be any, may qualify a public health emergency
as a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN
Charter? Judged by such objective criteria, has the UNSC, by not
qualifying the COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to international peace and
not addressing it as an international security issue in a timely manner,
failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security?
In order to address these research questions, this Article analyzes the
practice of the UNSC pertaining to this subject area and draws on the
basic criteria of legitimacy that the UNSC should address in considering
whether to qualify, and upon such a determination, accordingly act on, a
15
public health emergency as a threat to international peace and security.
These criteria include the following six considerations: (1) seriousness,
scale, duration, and intensity of a public health threat; (2) proper purpose
of the UNSC's qualification and ensuing action; (3) the necessity and
appropriateness of the UNSC's recommendations or enforcement
measures (the "last resort" argument); (4) proportionality between the
UNSC's qualification and recommendations or enforcement measures on
the one hand, and the existing public health threat on the other; (5)
13. Thomas M. Franck, The United Nations as Guarantor of International Peace and
Security: Past, Present andFuture, in THE UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFTY: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

25, 37 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1995).
14. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and

Change, ¶ 205, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
15. Id. ¶ 207.
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reasonableness of the UNSC's determination and intervention, as well as
balance of probable consequences of the UNSC's action or inaction; and
(6) the need for a joint and coordinated international action. 16
This Article moreover identifies the underlying rationales for the
UNSC's unprincipled approach in designating various scenarios of
disease outbreaks as threats to international security: (1) the specific
context and nature of a public health crisis at issue; (2) the level of reliable
information available to the UNSC and evidence to support its decisionmaking on the issue; (3) the link, however slight, between a public health
event and a conflict or post-conflict situation; and (4) the political will of
the UNSC members, notably those with permanent membership.' 7
However, the picture is further complicated by .the current crisis of
multilateral governance centered on the UN. Some of the UN member
states are increasingly resisting and even actively undermining
international cooperation, as the current issues, inter-state accusations,
and disputes surrounding the ongoing COVID-19 crisis showcase. 18
These factors leave the precise contours ofthe UN securitization of global
health undefined.
This Article begins in Part I by briefly outlining the development of
the notion of a threat to international peace and security and its
applicability to pandemics and other public health emergencies, and sets
the scene for the forthcoming discussion. Part II of this Article surveys
the relevant UNSC practice in determining the existence of a threat to
international peace and security to flesh out what scenarios of infectious
disease outbreaks may constitute such a threat. It discusses a number of
determining criteria which can be relied on in deciding whether or not to
turn a public health event into a security issue at the UN level.
Part III goes on to apply these criteria to the case study of COVID-19
to support the thesis that the UNSC, by not taking. a sufficiently early
stage a specific and resolute action in response to the global pandemic
and designating it as a threat to international peace and security, betrayed
its goal. Part IV turns to critically analyze the content and implications of
the recent UNSC resolution on the COVID-19 pandemic, thereby also
articulating its merits and shortcomings, and provides some insights on
the next possible steps of the UNSC concerning this issue. Lastly, this
Article offers conclusions in light of the research questions and briefly
discusses the broader implications of the findings for other relatively new
threats that may be considered to fall within the ambit of discretionary
powers of the UNSC under Article 39 of the UN Charter.

16. Id.

¶¶ 207, 209.

17. Wellens, supra note 7, at 21-22 . Hood, supra note 9, at 38, 42.
18. Raymundo T. Treves, The Health of InternationalCooperationand UNGA Resolution

74/274, 70 QUESTIONS INT'L L. 21, 23-27 (2020).
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I. THE TRADITIONAL SCOPE OF THE CONCEPT "A THREAT TO
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY" AND GLOBAL PANDEMIC AS A
SECURITY THREAT OF OUR TIME

A cursory glance at its practice shows that the UNSC can be very
creative and capable of extending considerably the scope and reach of its
jurisdiction and the rules it is entrusted to interpret, including the concept
of a threat to international peace and security.
First in this part, I set out the traditional scope of this concept and
consider whether its extension to public health emergencies in any way
erodes legal and political restraints. Then, I explain why the UNSC's
determination of a public health emergency as a threat to international
peace and security and its subsequent decision on the ensuing measures
is not in contravention of any restraining principles integral to or
stemming from the UN legal framework and is therefore both legal and
legitimate by its nature.
To substantiate this claim, I examine the legal and political limits
accompanying the interpretation and application of Article 39 of the UN
Charter in addressing public health events with an international element
or of international repercussions. I accordingly contend and explain why
neither such restraints nor the UNSC mandate are affected by an extended
interpretation of the notion-a threatto international peace-and security-and its application to public health issues of international concern.
Finally, I provide a brief historical overview of the development of
interdependence between public health and international security in the
practice of the UNSC.
A. Article 39 of the UN Charter and the Limits of its Interpretation and
Application
Helmut Freudenschuss, a former Representative of Austria in the
UNSC, once wrote that Article 39 of the UN Charter represents "the true
9
grey area in the practice of the SC."1 It is hard to disagree with this
assertion. Indeed, it is not obvious how the UNSC could construe and
apply the provisions of Article 39 to non-military sources of instability
peace
that prima facie have very little or nothing to do with international
20
Charter.
UN
the
of
drafters
the
by
and security, as understood
At first sight, a public health event, such as the outbreak and spread
of infectious disease, seems an excellent candidate for the kind of "nontraditional" international peace and security issues that could be
subsumed under this notion. In order to ascertain whether pandemic and
19. Helmut Freudenschuss, Article 39 of the UN Charter Revisited: Threats to the Peace
and the Recent Practice of the UN Security Council, 46 AUSTRIAN J. PUB. & INT'L L. 1, 3 (1993).

20. It should be noted, though, that since the UN Charter is a living instrument, the views

and intentions of the drafters are of decreasing relevance as time goes on.
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other public health emergencies of a similar nature and gravity can even
be considered to constitute a threat to international peace and security so
as to trigger the application of Article 39 of the UN Charter, it is first
necessary to examine the original meaning and later development of this
rather nebulous concept, coupled with its increasingly broadened scope
of application.
With its broad phrase, a threat to international peace and security, or,
more precisely, "threat to peace," Article 39 gives the jurisdictional
minimum for the UNSC's action. 2 1 In other words, to be able to define
the minimum criteria that a situation involving a public health emergency
must fulfill in order to permit action by the UNSC, it is important to
determine what the concept itself entails. For this to be done, a closer look
at the relevant practice of the UNSC is needed, as this seems to be the
most suitable technique for interpreting the UN Charter and its individual
provisions. 2 2 Moreover, because the UNSC is specifically mandated to
use the concept, it would be preposterous to ignore its subsequent
interpretation and action. 23

The term "a threat to international peace and security" has
traditionally been understood as involving situations of armed conflict
(international and civil wars) or situations that are likely to give rise to
"armed conflict ... in the short or medium term." 24 The latter situations
include, for example, grave human rights violations, serious humanitarian
crises, massive flows of refugees, and post-conflict states where there is
a high level of instability. 2
While these interpretations by the UNSC of the notion of a threat to
international peace and security are now uncontroversial and widely
accepted among the UN member states, other occasional attempts of the
UNSC to expand the scope of the doctrine have not gathered sufficient
support in the international community. Nor have they resulted in
consistent and uniform practice over a longer period of time by the UNSC
or the UN member states. Examples of such declarations by the UNSC
that a particular situation, matter, or issue amounts to a threat to
international peace and security include "general risks-such as the
possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of nonstate actors." 26
21. U.N. Charter art. 39.
22. Robert Cryer, The Security Counciland Article 39: A Threat to Coherence, 1 J. ARMED
CONFLICT L. 161, 164 (1996).

23. Id.
24. ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

139 (2004). See also Nico Krisch, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 39, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY

1272, 1279 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).

25. See Cryer, supra note 22, at 178-81; see also Wellens, supra note 7, at 42-47.
26. See Hood, supra note 9, at 35.
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It is thus possible to conclude that there needs to be at least some form
of connection to armed conflict for the UNSC to be able to determine that
a certain situation, issue, or matter constitutes a threat to international
peace and security. Hence, public health emergencies do not appear to be
part of this classic conception of a threat to international peace and
security, which is mainly concerned with protecting the nation states from
armed conflicts, rather than with the security of individuals. Yet, as it can
be viewed from its practice discussed below (including Resolution 2177),
the UNSC has nonetheless been able to find ways to reach the necessary
consensus and express its interpretative creativity, at times even with bold
manifestations of its discretionary powers, thus developing the concept
of a threat to international peace and security in unexpected directions.
In regard to the possibilities and ways for the UNSC to qualify a public
health emergency as a threat to international peace and security, a few
other pertinent points need to be made. First, the notion of a threat to
international peace and security has been described as a "very vague and
elastic hypothesis which may cover the widest range of behavior by a
State," 27 as well as the "broadest and most indistinct concept in Art.
39."28
Second, when referring to the concept, the UNSC has on occasion
used different adjectives to highlight the gravity of the situation, issue, or
matter in question-as a result of subsequent facts, events, or incidents30
ranging from a "greater threat," 29 an "increasing threat," a "serious and
33
32
growing threat,"' a "most serious threat[]," to an "aggravating threat[]."
Third, the notion can encompass the continuation of a situation that
constitutes such a threat to international peace and security or both the
34
continuation and the aggravation of a situation.
Having briefly examined the original meaning and core content of the
concept of a threat to international peace and security, as well as its
subsequent extensions in the evolving practice of the UNSC, I shall now
turn to consider whether the limited discretion of the UNSC in the
interpretation and application of Article 39 of the UN Charter bars such
27. BENEDETTO CONFORTI

&

CARLO FOCARELLI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED

NATIONS 223 (5th ed. 2016).
28. Jochen Frowein, Article 39, in

605, 610
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY

(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994).
S.C. Res. 1297, ¶ 6 (May 12, 2000).
S.C. Res. 1298, ¶ 13 (May 17, 2000).
S.C. Res. 1193, ¶ 5 (Aug. 28, 1998).
S.C. Res. 1377, ¶ 4 (Nov. 12, 2001).
S.C. Res. 841, 1 10 (June 16, 1993).

34. Compare, e.g., S.C. Res. 713, ¶ 5 (Sept. 25, 1991) ("Concernedthatthe continuation of
this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security"), with S.C. Res. 721, ¶ 5
(Nov. 27, 1991) ("Noting that the continuation and aggravation of this situation constitute a threat
to international peace and security").
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extensions in the context of public health emergencies. It bears recalling
in this respect that the UNSC's authority to make the threshold
determination regarding the existence of a threat to international peace
and security (which itself is more of a political than legal. concept) is a
legal obligation and as such does not enjoy an unlimited discretion.
The determination of a threat to international peace and security is
thus not-as Judge Schwebel argued in Nicaragua v. USA-a purely
political decision, and as such solely within the UNSC's discretion. 3 5
This implies that decisions of the UNSC on whether or not a public health
issue constitutes a threat to international peace and security must always
be within certain limits.
In the first place, they must be "within the limits of the Purposes and
Principles of the [UN] Charter" as required by Article 24(2) of the UN
Charter and emphasized by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadid.36 The
purposes and principles of the UN are set out in Chapter I (Articles 1 and
2) of the UN Charter. There are several among them that are particularly
relevant for determining that a public health emergency constitutes a
threat to international peace and security: the maintenance of
international peace and security, the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights, and acting as a center for harmonizing the
actions of states in the attainment of these common ends. 37
All of these purposes and principles can be seen as "flexible and
evolutionary" by nature, 38 thus capable of many different interpretations,
including those recognizing a serious public health issue as an
international security concern. Therefore, by no means can the UNSC's
determination that "a widespread outbreak of a deadly infectious disease
constitutes a threat to international peace and security" be considered
manifestly contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Nor
can the application of objective criteria for finding such situations as
threatening international peace and security be seen as capable of
modifying the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as regards the
powers vested by States in the UNSC.
The UNSC's broad discretion is moreover to be exercised bonafide
(in good faith) and as such should never amount to an abuse of its
power.39 Not only can a requirement of the UN organs (including the
35. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 l.C.J. 14, ¶ 60 (June 27) (dissenting opinion by Schwebel, J.).
36. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 29 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
37. U.N. Charter arts. 1, 2.
38. See Cryer, supra note 22, at 168.

39. Id. at 169.
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UNSC) to act in good faith be implied from the duty of respect for
international law, it has also been purposefully integrated into UN
Charter law (Article 2(2)). The principle of good faith as one of the basic
principles regulating the creation and performance of legal obligations by
subjects of international law (including international organizations) has
been recognized in both international jurisprudence and international
40
legal scholarship for many years.
In practice, it would be very difficult to prove an actual case of the
UNSC acting in bad faith by adopting a resolution on a public health
emergency as an international security issue. It is more likely that, when
appropriate, the UNSC will invoke good faith as a general principle of
international law in such a resolution, for example, by reminding the UN
member states to discharge their pertinent obligations and responsibilities
fully and in good faith, in order to curb a dangerous spread of infectious
disease and mitigate its harmful consequences.
Another potential limit on the UNSC's authority of a rather general
nature is the doctrine of abuse of power. The doctrine was first mentioned
in the Namibia case in the dissenting opinions of Judges Gerald
Fitzmaurice and Gros.41 Still broader articulations of this doctrine are to
be found in the Tadi majority decision, and especially in the separate
opinion of Judge Sidhwa, who pointed out that every decision of the
UNSC needs to be "fair and not arbitrary or a feigned exercise of
power." 42 It must be based on a proper evaluation of the evidence,
"reasonable and fair and not arbitrary or capricious."43
Accordingly, any manifest irregularity in determining a public health
crisis as constituting a threat to international peace and security would

40. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20); Appellate
15 8,
Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof CertainShrimp and Shrimp Products, 1
IN
FAITH
GOOD
O'CONNOR,
F.
JOHN
1998);
12,
Oct.
(adopted
WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R
PLANCK
MAX
in
fide),
(Bona
Faith
Good
Kotzur,
Markus
(1991);
LAW
INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R~idiger Wolfrum ed., 2009); ROBERT KOLB, LA
DES PRINCIPES
BONNE FOI EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: CONTRIBUTION A L'ETUDE

Faith
GENERAUx Du DROIT (2000); Michel Virally, Notes and Comments: Review Essay: Good
FAITH IN
GOOD
PANIZZON,
MARION
(1983);
130
L.
INT'L
J.
AM.
77
Law,
International
in Public
GOOD FAITH
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO: THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS,
(2006).
INTERPRETATION AND FAIR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

41. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
1971
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21) (dissenting opinion by Fritzmaurice, J.); Id. ¶ 28 (dissenting opinion by

Gros,

J.).

42. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 161 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia

Oct. 2, 1995).
43. Id.
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call into question the legality of such a determination.44 This implies that
no objection can be taken to the exercise of its discretion when the UNSC
makes a full appraisal of the evidence in light of the proposed qualifying
criteria, and then determines on that basis, without any arbitrariness,
whether or not a public health emergency falls within Article 39 of the
UN Charter. However, in the situation of an increasingly secretive
UNSC, a major challenge remains how to prove any such abuse of its
power.45
The validity of the UNSC's decisions is also limited by international
jus cogens norms, as defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. 46 While Article 103 of the UN Charter puts the
Charter itself in a hierarchically higher position than all other
international treaties, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention declares that
all international treaties (including the UN Charter) that conflict with jus
cogens are void.47 Given that the UNSC draws its power from the UN
Charter, its decisions cannot take precedence over jus cogens.48 The view
that the concept of jus cogens is a restraint on the UNSC's actions can
also find support in some international judicial opinions. 49 It is, however,
difficult to imagine a situation in which the declaration of a public health
issue as constituting a threat to international peace and security could
conflict with any peremptory norm of general international law.
Perhaps the most tangible current restraint on the UNSC's decision to
classify a public health issue as a threat to international peace and security
is that of political considerations. Article 27 of the UN Charter specifies
that a resolution on non-procedural matters is adopted if it obtains nine
positive votes and is not vetoed by any of the five permanent members of
the UNSC. 50 It is also true that, as some authors have noted, the capability
of the UNSC's resolution "to command respect, and thus compliance"5
will depend on the level of perceived fairness of both the decision-making
process of this organ and its resolution as the outcome of this process.
44. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship between the International Court of
Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643, 671

(1994).
45. See Cryer, supra note 22, at 169.

46. Id at 170; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of

State Responsibility, 43 INT'L & COMPAR. L. Q. 55, 93 (1994).
47. Cryer, supra note 22, at 169.

48. Id
49. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa
on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 20, 23, 35, and 74 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Application of Convention on Prevention and
Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Provisional Measures,

1993 I.C.J. 325,

¶ 100 (Sept. 13).

50. U.N. Charter arts. 27.

51. See Cryer, supra note 22, at 172; THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 218 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
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Assessing and qualifying a public health emergency as a threat to
international peace and security on the basis of objective criteria would
certainly enhance perceptions of fairness of the UNSC's decisions on this
subject matter among the UN member states, and consequently improve
their overall implementation.
The limitations on the power of the UNSC to determine the existence
of a threat to international peace and security as examined above are
necessary because of the danger of presenting any acutely controversial
international situation as involving a potential threat to international
peace and security, "even where it is really too remote genuinely to
constitute one." 5 2 Indeed, without these restraints, the functions of the
3
UNSC "could be used for purposes never originally intended." Having
established the (broad) limits within which the UNSC may determine
threats to international peace and security, it remains to survey the raw
material of its practice to examine the applicability of the concept to the
situations of public health emergencies. This material is presented and
further discussed in what follows.
B. The Recent History of a Public Health-InternationalSecurity
Interrelationshipin the UN Security Council
Historically, public health and security were treated independently
54
from each other-that is, as separate legal, policy, and practical issues.
They also formed part of different policy domains. Since the 1990s,
however, this historical perception of a public health-security relationship
55
has drastically changed.
The main catalyst for this change has been the perceived increased
risk of acts of bioterrorism and other military acts that may lead to the
international spread of diseases (for example, the intentional release of
biological, chemical, or radiological agents) as well as naturally
56
occurring outbreaks of infectious diseases as a global public health risk.
Hence, it was not until the early post-Cold War period-when the
menace of inter-state armed conflicts considerably diminished-that the
first tendencies in the direction of connecting public health protection and

52. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia

(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1870
I.C.J. 16, ¶ 116 (June 21) (dissenting opinion by Fitzmaurice, J.).
53. Id.
54. Gian Luca Burci, Ebola, the Security Council and the Securitization of Public Health,

10 QUESTIONS INT'L L. 27, 33 (2014).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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the maintenance of international peace and security began to emerge. 57
Such an understanding of global health securitization focused on the
anthropocentric notion of "human security," thus enabling consideration
of international security dimension of infectious disease outbreaks as
"non-traditional" threats to international peace and security.58
In this context, the first notable event under the auspices of the UNSC
was the open debate held in January 2000 on "The situation in Africa:
The impact of AIDS on international peace and security." 59 Following
this debate, the UNSC linked the mandates and training of peacekeeping
operations to the prevention of the spread of disease, but in the end, it did
not deem it necessary to qualify HIV/AIDS as a threat to international
peace and security. 60 However, UNSC Resolution 1308 reconceptualized
the HIV/AIDS pandemic as not only a humanitarian catastrophe, but a
risk to national security and international stability. 6 1 Four years later, in
2004, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) convened the High-level Panel
on Threats, Challenges, and Change. The Panel issued a report in which
it called for an increased cooperation between the UNSC and WHO in
enforcing, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, effective quarantine
measures and cordon operations. 62
A further step in this process of converging global public health and
international peace and security was the 2005 UNSG report "In larger
freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all." 63 In
this report, the UNSG stated, inter alia, his readiness for acting under
Article 99 of the UN Charter whenever needed, so as to bring to the
attention of the UNSC, in consultation with WHO, any suspicious or
overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease that may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security.64
The above-mentioned 2014 Resolution 2177 on the Ebola epidemic in
West Africa remains the lone example of the UNSC's qualification of a
57. Other prominent and controversial examples of the UNSC's broadened interpretation
of the term "a threat to international peace and security" can be found in its resolutions concerned
with the internal situations in Somalia (Resolution 733), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Resolution

770), and Haiti (Resolutions 841 and 873) in the early 1990s. S.C. Res. 733 (Jan. 23, 1992); S.C.
Res. 770 (Aug. 13, 1992); S.C. Res. 841 (June 16, 1993); S.C. Res. 873 (Oct. 13, 1993).
58. Gian Luca Burci & Jakob Quirin, Ebola, WHO and the United Nations: Convergence

of Global Public Health and International Peace and Security, 18 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS
(Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/25/ebola-who-and-united-nations

-convergence-global-public-health-and [https://perma cc/KC94-VVTG].
59. U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4087th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4087 (Jan. 10, 2000).
60. S.C. Res. 1308, ¶ 3 (July 17, 2000).
61. Id. at 2.
62. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and

Change, ¶ 144, U.N Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).

63. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rightsfor All - Report of the Secretary-General,1 105, A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).

64. Id.
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public health crisis as a threat to international peace and security, even in
the wake of the eerie COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. This resolution
expanded the concept of threat to international peace and security and
implicitly the scope of the powers of the UNSC under the UN Charter.
As such, the resolution finds its legal basis in Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, although in the given case the UNSC took no enforcement action
under this Chapter.
While the resolution represents a significant departure from the
UNSC's previous practice of declaring threats to international peace and
security under Article 39 of the UN Charter, it cannot be regarded as a
precedent; indeed, it has so far had no precedential effect. Nonetheless,
according to some commentators, this document has a remarkable
declarative value, for it represents "the most cogent recognition to date
of the security implications of widespread outbreaks of lethal infectious
diseases." 65
In 2019, the UNSC unanimously adopted a resolution on the 20182020 Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
which addressed the dangerous spread of the disease in the DRC and
wider region, but only peripherally and indirectly. The resolution also
included measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, it was
the protracted armed conflict in the country, rather than the risk of
spreading the disease itself that prompted the UNSC to impose the
enforcement measures. 66
There was also a much delayed response of the UNSC to the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic. This delay has worsened the suffering of innocent
civilians and the humanitarian crisis in the midst of the COVID-19
pandemic, further undermined the stability and deteriorated the political
and security climate in the most affected countries and regions, and even
led to instances of civil unrest and social and inter-ethnic tensions in some
countries.
At long last, on July 1, 2020, the UNSC unanimously adopted
Resolution 2532 (2020) on cessation of hostilities in the context of the
67
coronavirus disease (COVID-19). With this long-awaited move the
UNSC considered, once again, that the unprecedented extent of the
COVID-19 pandemic may potentially endanger the maintenance of
68
international peace and security, but it did not go so far as to pronounce
that the global pandemic does constitute a threat to international peace
and security. Nevertheless, the resolution has confirmed and strengthened
a recent trend to construe infectious diseases as security threats besides
public health risks and thus to securitize public health emergencies,
65. Burci, supra note 54.

66. See generally S.C. Res. 2439, ¶ 11 (Oct. 30, 2018).
67. S.C. Res. 2532 (July 1, 2020).
68. Id. at l.
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especially in countries involved in armed conflicts or affected by
humanitarian crises and in post-conflict situations.
Other public health emergencies, such as the 2002-2004 SARS
outbreak, the H1NI influenza pandemic, and the Zika outbreak in the
Americas were not addressed by the UNSC, notwithstanding that their
health impact was of similarly grave international concern. 69
This preliminary examination of the UNSC's ad hoc treatment of
various situations involving a public health emergency of international
concern reveals that an international security dimension is not a given in
all such scenarios. In general, there seem to be four main factors that play
a role in turning a public health issue into an international security matter:
(1) the context and nature of the public health crisis in question; (2) the
availability of relevant information and evidence on the issue; (3) the link,
however slight, between a public health event and a conflict or postconflict situation; and (4) the political will of the UNSC members.70
II. CRITERIA FOR QUALIFYING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY AS "A
THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY"

The effectiveness of the UN collective security system is predicated
not only on the legality of the UNSC's decisions but also on the common
perception of their legitimacy. To enhance this general perception, the
UNSC's decisions should be "made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for
the right reasons, morally as well as legally." 7' In deciding whether to
qualify a public health emergency as a threat to international peace and
security, the UNSC should adopt and systematically address a set of
agreed guidelines. While such guidelines will probably not ensure that
"the objectively best outcome will always prevail ... [they can] maximize
the possibility of achieving Security Council consensus around when it is
appropriate," or even imperative, to declare a public health crisis a threat
to international peace and security. 7 2 In so doing, they can "maximize
international support for whatever the [UNSC] decides" concerning the
concrete public health emergency situation, and "minimize the possibility
of individual Member States bypassing the Security Council."

69. In her essay, Josie Homung offers some arguments why the Zika outbreak did not meet
the threshold to make its international securitization appropriate. According to her, this public
health event did not yet pose a sufficiently quantifiable and serious security risk. Josie
Hornung,
Securitization of Zika, E-INT'L RELS. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.e-ir.info/2016/08/17/securiti
sation-of-zika/ [https://perma.cc/8Q9X-YE59].
70. See Bodgdandy & Villarreal, supra note 5, at 22-23.

71. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, ¶ 204, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
72. Id. ¶ 206.
73. Id.
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The UNSC is authorized to objectively determine whether a public
health issue qualifies under the UN Charter provisions as the kind of
situation that is a threat to international peace and security. By
"objective," I do not necessarily mean that the UNSC's decision is
objective in the scientific sense of the word. Whilst, as we have seen
above, this determination is to some extent based on certain legal criteria
(limitations) as the UNSC's decisions are subject to standards imposed
by the UN legal framework and the UNSC cannot lawfully overstep these
constraints, it is essentially a political decision. The expression
"objective" in this sense signifies that it is a collective decision-making
organ that makes a binding determination (under Articles 39 and 25 of
the UN Charter) of how the situation of a public health emergency shall
be classified (as a threat to international peace and security or not).
Based on the practice of the UNSC as developed so far, a certain
number of variables can be. put forward for the assessment of whether a
public health emergency constitutes a threat to international peace and
security. These guiding criteria for qualifying a public health crisis as a
threat to international peace and security should be embodied m
declaratory resolutions of the UNSC and the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA). While discussing each of the criteria below, I also
identify, where appropriate, their merits and limits and engage with the
most obvious counterarguments and potential objections to their
applicability in the situations of public health emergencies.
A pragmatic caveat should be entered here. In order to be able to
consider the appropriateness of qualifying a public health emergency as
a threat to international peace and security, the UNSC must first have
timely, accurate, and reliable information on the public health event and
sufficient factual knowledge of the matter. Such relevant information
may originate from a variety of sources, including reports submitted by
the UN Secretary-General, other principal organs of the UN and relevant
UN agencies, UN member states' briefs, as well as views presented by
external actors such as academia, the media, and NGOs. Given that the
reports of the UN Secretary-General have been a major source of
information, the UN Secretariat needs to ensure that the quality and speed
of the flow of information and its analysis capacity suffice to support the
decision-making process of the UNSC. The lack of such information or
very limited knowledge of facts may be one of the reasons for inaction or
belated action by the UNSC.
Another related issue is that of the burden of proof and evidence. In
weighing the gravity of emergency cases, the UNSC also exercises its
fact-finding function. Whether a public health emergency amounts to a
threat to international peace and security is primarily "a question of
evidence, a question of proving things," rather than a question of legal
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interpretation. 7 4 Acting in good faith, the UNSC should always reject
fraudulent or inauthentic evidence and comply with the standard of
preponderance of evidence (as generally considered to be sufficient for
making recommendations or the imposition of measures not involving
the use of force) 75 when assessing the public health emergency situation
against the qualification criteria below. This being the case, one should
also be aware that in urgent cases, where time constraints play a
significant role, the UNSC is only capable of a prima facie evidence
evaluation. 76
A. Seriousness of a Health Security Threat
In determining whether a public health emergency constitutes a
genuine threat to stability, security, and peace in the affected area or
region, the UNSC should first consider the following question: is the
threatened harm to state or human security of a kind, and sufficiently
clear, quantifiable and serious, to justify prima facie such a qualification?
In other words, a public health event has to reach a certain magnitude to
give rise to international concern and subsequent pronouncement or
determination of a threat to international peace and security by the UNSC.
To contend that a public health issue may have a distant repercussion on
the maintenance of international peace and security is not enough for the
UNSC to avail of its function of global governance for that matter.
The UNSC members should deliberate on whether an unexpected
public health event that carries implications beyond the affected state's
national borders is serious, sudden, or unusual enough to require
immediate and coordinated international action. For example, a formal
declaration by the WHO that an extraordinary event which is determined
to constitute a public health risk to other states through the international
spread of an infectious disease amounts to a public health emergency of
international concern (PHEIC) could be seen as fulfilling this minimum
requirement. 77

When evaluating the level of seriousness of a public health threat, the
UNSC should take into account several factors. First, it should assess the
prospects of chaos, tensions, and even conflict outbreak within the
affected states or wider region because of social, humanitarian, political,
and economic instability caused by a public health emergency. In other
words, the UNSC should consider whether such a multidimensional
destabilization either in individual states or in the region as a whole is of
74. Wellens, supra note 7, at 23.
75. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 19, 22 (2002).
76. Wellens, supra note 7, at 24.
77. Since 2009, there have been six declarations of a PHEIC: the 2009 HINI (swine flu)
pandemic, the 2014 polio declaration, the 2014 outbreak of Ebola in Western Africa, the 2015-

16 Zika virus epidemic, and the ongoing 2018-20 Kivu Ebola epidemic and COVID-19 pandemic.
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such a nature, gravity, and extent that it poses a real prospect of conflict
occurring in the short- to medium-term. A special attention in this context
should be dedicated to states involved in armed conflicts and post-conflict
states with ongoing peace-building efforts and fragile social fabric and
institutions.
Obviously, pandemic and other public health threats of similar gravity
and scope aggravate the situation in states involved in armed conflicts
and those facing humanitarian crises. It has been common for the UNSC
to find that a threat to international peace and security exists in postconflict situations where states are unstable and there is a reasonable
prospect that conflict may ignite again. 78 Some challenging questions,
however, remain for the UNSC to resolve. For example:
How much instability is required before a situation involving
a public health emergency can be classified as a threat to
international peace and security? What should the UNSC
have regard to when examining whether there is instability
in an affected state, area or region? How should the UNSC
measure levels of instability within such states, areas or
regions? 79
An additional perspective that the UNSC should take and which is to
be complementary to that of a "state, area, or region security" aspect, is
to assess whether a public health emergency constitutes a threat to human
security. The UNSC has not accepted the notions of human security as
falling within the parameters of a threat to international peace and
security where they arose without any connection with an armed conflict.
Nevertheless, the UNSC should explore the immediate and potential
devastating effects of a highly infectious disease on individuals' lives,
health, wellbeing, and personal security (as subsidiary evidence) before
deciding on whether to qualify a public health crisis as a threat to
international peace and security.
A public health emergency may also give rise to food crises and
starvation, poverty, precarity, unemployment, deterioration in living
standards, instill widespread panic and generate feelings of fear, anxiety,
and insecurity in the affected populations. While sickness, poverty, and
hunger do not directly cause conflicts, it is also true that situations of
insecurity may arise in the wake of so many injustices resulting from a
public health crisis. Taking into account all these elements, the UNSC
should especially consider whether it is imperative for the international
community to mobilize a coordinated response in order to prevent the
existing situation from becoming a humanitarian catastrophe. Human
78. Hood, supra note 9, at 38.
79. Id. at 44.
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security concerns are thus also relevant to discussions within the UNSC
about activating its Chapter VII powers through Article 39 of the UN
Charter.
In the mainstream literature on the subject, both justifications and
criticisms concerning the international securitization of public health
crises can be observed. The main rationale behind the securitization of
public health is the general perception that highly infectious diseases
spreading beyond national borders may erode social, economic, and
political stability in the affected countries and regions, thus deteriorating
the whole situation by creating tensions, chaos, or even conflict and
possibly leading to massive displacement of the population. All this may,
in turn, affect the security perception of the countries not directly
involved in the crisis but with interests in the affected region.80
Some scholars have identified the synergetic effects of a public health
emergency as another rationale for the international securitization of
public health. 8 1 They have reasoned that when a public health crisis hits,
the first line of defense is the public health sector. For example,
strengthening a public health system because of bioterrorism and possible
use of biological weapons actually serves the purposes of both biosecurity
and defending from naturally emerging infectious diseases. In addition,
securitizing health may also entail that a larger share of national budgets
initially doled out to the security and defense sectors will be redirected to
public health resources and capabilities, while military forces will be
much better prepared and equipped to help in outbreak response.
These arguments in support of public health securitization have been
challenged on several fronts. The first important criticism that can be
leveled at the attempts to securitize public health emergencies pertains to
the fact that historical evidence has not shown any link between
communicable diseases and political stability. For example, the HIVAIDS pandemic in Africa did not have any obvious impact on the
political stability of affected countries. 82 Likewise, modern history has
not confirmed that infectious diseases may become security threats to
affected countries. Moreover, critical scholars have noted that panic and
overly coercive responses by non-affected or little affected states
generate a much greater threat than the epidemic/pandemic itself. 83

80. See Burci & Quirin, supra note 58, at 35.

81. See David P. Fidler & Lawrence

O. Gostin,

BIOSECURITY IN THE GLOBAL AGE:

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE RULE OF LAW

121-45

(2008).

82. Alex de Waal, Reframing Governance, Security and Conflict in the Light of HI V/AIDS:
A Synthesis of Findingsfrom the AIDS, Security and Conflict Initiative, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 114,
116 (2010).
83. Alex de Waal, Militarizing Global Health, Bos. REV. (Nov. 11, 2014),
http://bostonreview.net/world/alex-de-waal-militarizing-global-health-ebola

[https://permascc/

8XZ2-CAVN].
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In a similar vein, some "other scholars have sought to make a strong
case that considering diseases as security threats diverts the focus from
where it should be-this is, away from civil society, toward military and
intelligence organizations." 84 In their view, securitization of health may
also encourage and provide further justificatory ground for an
authoritarian approach and coercive measures of some states, which may
easily lead to human rights violations, discrimination, and stigmatization
85
of victims without obvious benefits for public health issues.
Some further challenges and limits can be noted regarding the
applicability of the "seriousness" criterion in practice. For some authors,
the lack of even the slightest link between a public health emergency and
military violence or the prospect of armed conflict seems to be an
insurmountable obstacle for the UNSC to be able to qualify such a
86
situation as an Article 39 threat. This view is, however, only partly
substantiated, as today it is not only armed conflicts and military attacks
which are the phenomena of great gravity and imminence that justify such
a qualification by the UNSC. It is clear that, at the international level,
public health events such as pandemics cannot be addressed merely as
health issues as they involve multifaceted security dimensions.
In many cases, epidemic and pandemic outbreaks have also posed
"existential threats" to people; that is, they have been extraordinary
events that have threatened the existence of non-state actors such as
civilians or peacekeepers. International securitization of infectious
disease outbreak events thus also serves the higher purposes of protecting
human lives and human health. As the heart of any security agenda should
be protecting lives, a highly infectious disease that threatens everything
from economic strength to peacekeeping clearly is an international peace
and security threat of the greatest magnitude. To be sure, the UNSC
should require state security and, in particular, human security to be
threatened to a certain level of severity before it determines that a public
health emergency amounts to a threat to international peace and security.
The main concern in this regard, however, is that its judgments about the
severity of the public health situation may not "be made on a purely
objective basis." 87
It has moreover been noted that ideas such as an outbreak of an
epidemic or the spreading of an infectious disease internationally cause
social, economic, and political instability, severely threaten human
security, and give rise to an emergency situation constitutes a threat
within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter without requiring the
prospect of conflict considerably stretch the traditional conception of a
84. Burci & Quirin, supra note 58, at 36.

85. Id.
86. See Hood, supra note 9, at 34.
87. Id. at 45.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol33/iss1/1

22

Maucec: Qualifying a Public Health Emergency as "A Threat to Internationa

2021 ]

QUALIFYING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

23

threat to international peace and security.88 For example, framing public
health events as issues of "economic and social instability" within a state
or region, "human security," and emergencies, crises, or very grave
situations that require international cooperation for their resolution bring
to the discussion broad, vague, and malleable concepts and terms whose
limits and parameters are difficult to discern. 89 This, in turn, makes it
possible that a very wide range of situations, including public health
issues, may come within the parameters of such concepts.
On the other hand, it has also been suggested at the international
political level that it is high time that the UNSC embraced a broader
understanding of the concept of a threat to international peace and
security. 90 While its drafters may well have had armed attacks and
hostilities in mind when they wrote the relevant provisions of the UN
Charter, we should not close our eyes to other major international security
threats of our time. As German Minister for Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas
pointed out, "today, we know that a virus can be deadlier than a gun, that
a cyberattack can cause more harm than a soldier, and that climate change
threatens more people than most conventional weapons." 9 1
It is thus important to recognize new threats to international peace and
security emanating from pandemics, climate change, and cybercrime.
This was also emphasized at the UNSC open video-teleconference on the
implications of COVID-19 on the maintenance of international peace and
security, following the adoption of its resolution on COVID-19. As
Noureddine Erray, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, stated at this
meeting, "it is clear that we cannot face such dangers using the same
instruments we have inherited from the old times." 92 Hence, a change of
paradigm is necessary.
B. Proper Purpose of the UNSC's Action
Another important criterion for the UNSC to consider is whether it is
clear that the primary purpose of qualifying the public health threat in
question as a threat to international peace and security and of the
proposed international action is to halt, avert and minimize such a threat
in order to prevent its escalation to the level of a large-scale humanitarian
catastrophe, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved.

88. See id. at 44-45.

89. Id. at 43.
90. Press Release, Security Council, COVID-19 'Profoundly Affecting Peace across the
Globe', Says Secretary-General, in Address to Security Council, U.N. Press Release SC/14241

(July 2, 2020).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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C. The UNSC's Action as the Last Resort
The "last resort" reasoning is another guiding criterion that the UNSC
should turn to when deciding whether to qualify a public health
emergency as a threat to international security. Premature international
securitization of a disease outbreak can have devastating effects on
countries and regions dealing with a disease. In this respect, the UNSC
should always ask itself whether every option for meeting the public
health threat in question, other than non-military enforcement measures,
has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other
measures will not succeed.
D. The UNSC's Intervention as a ProportionalMeans
A further major consideration for the UNSC should be whether the
qualification of a public health emergency as a threat to international
peace and security, and on that basis, the scale, duration, and intensity of
the proposed action (principally in the form of recommendations or, when
necessary, non-military measures of enforcement) are the minimum
necessary to meet the public health threat in question. This also implies
that a coordinated response of the international community authorized by
the UNSC needs to be commensurate in scale and pace with the enormity
of the public health challenge.
As Louis Balmond has noted, the UNSC has under the UN Charter
not only the discretionary power to find the existence of a threat to
international peace and security; it can also choose the sort(s) of action to
3
respond to such a threat.9 In making full use of the possibilities provided
by Article 39, the UNSC can decide to take different forms of measures,
ranging from those least restrictive to those most restrictive or even
coercive. It can reasonably be expected, however, that in most of the
infectious disease outbreak events, the UNSC will typically consider it
sufficient to adopt non-binding recommendations.
In the context of a pandemic or other public health crisis, imposing
any kind of obligation appears inappropriate, disproportionate, and
unduly strict. This is even truer of unarmed or armed coercion provided
for in Articles 41 and 42, respectively. Such compulsory measures seem
to have little sense in responding to global health security threats.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the UNSC will find it necessary to use
this discretionary power on substantive questions and proceed from
recommendation to binding decision, for example, when it comes to the
request addressed to States to apply safety and health protocols or to lift
travel restrictions and restrictions at their borders imposed due to the
epidemic.
93. See Louis Balmond, Le Conseil de sicuriti et la crise d'Ebola: entregestion de la paix
et pilotage de la gouvernance globale, 10 QUESTIONS INT'L L. 5, 17 (2014).
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It is also possible that certain states adopt ineffective or overrestrictive public health measures not justified by medical necessity and
sound scientific evidence, or that they fail to adequately implement
temporary or standing recommendations issued by the relevant
WHO Committees. 94 In such cases when states behavior threatens the
international response to a public health crisis the UNSC could "put
pressure on those states that do not cooperate in good faith to global
disease control or even worsen the situation by failing to comply with the
core obligations imposed by the [international health regulations] and
human rights standards." 9 5
E. Reasonableness of the UNSC's Intervention and Balance of
Consequences
The next criterion for qualifying a public health emergency as a threat
to international peace and security concerns the question of whether there
is a reasonable chance of the recommendations or non-military
enforcement measures being successful in meeting the public health
threat in question, with the consequences of such an international
intervention not likely to be worse than the consequences of nonintervention. It may be more reasonable and appropriate for the UNSC
not to securitize a public health emergency in order to avoid generating
unnecessary panic, scaremongering, scapegoating, and increased
incidents of stigmatization, discrimination, and hate speech-related
violence which could further endanger social, economic, or political
instability in the affected countries or region(s).
Regarding the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, for
example, Katherine Harmon has noted that "misinformation and the
resulting anxiety of publicized health crises are far more dangerous than
the pathogens themselves." 96 Similarly, Josie Hornung has argued that
"Zika [did] not rise to the threshold of risk required to be considered a
threat to international security." 97 Because of the lack of reliable data on
its impact at that time, it was better to conceptualize Zika as an unknown
risk to the international community. 98 Given this lack of accurate
information, the WHO and the Brazilian government's responses to Zika

94. Stefania Negri, Communicable Disease Control, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL
HEALTH LAW 265, 296 (Gian Luca Burci & Brigit Toebes eds., 2018).
95. Id.
96. Katherine Harmon, Measuring the Zika Virus's International Security Implications,

SEC. MAG. (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/87004-measuring-thezika-viruss-international-security-implications [https://perma.cc/2UNL-V8JW].
97. Josie Hornung, Securitisation of Zika, E-INT'L RELS. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.eir.info/2016/08/17/securitisation-of-zika/ [https://perma.cc/XHB4-26DJ].

98. Id
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99
crisis could be regarded as measured and appropriate. Therefore, it was
unnecessary to elevate the securitization of this public health emergency
00
to the level of the UNSC.1

F. The Needfor a CoordinatedInternationalAction
The experience concerning epidemic/pandemic situations in recent
years demonstrates that both familiar and new infectious diseases require
concerted, inclusive, comprehensive and global international action, with
the UN playing a key coordinating role. Therefore, the UNSC should also
examine each concrete public health emergency from the perspective of
whether such a situation necessitates a substantial and coordinated global
response to tackle it more effectively. In particular, the UNSC needs to
consider whether it is itself the body of the UN that is best placed to
coordinate and facilitate such efforts at the international level. However,
the need for international attention, solidarity and assistance in combating
a public health threat is conditio sine qua non (an indispensable
condition) for the UNSC to address it and justify its characterization as a
threat to international peace and security.
III. CONCEPTUALIZING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AS "A THREAT TO
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY"

Using the above criteria for qualifying a public health emergency as a
threat to international peace and security, this part proceeds by criticizing
the approach that the UNSC has taken to address the COVID-19
pandemic with a twofold argument. First, I argue that the time factor
plays a huge role in responding to the global pandemic, and therefore the
UNSC should have acted much more promptly and efficiently than it did.
Even the UNSC itself previously admitted that "the control of outbreaks
of major infectious diseases requires urgent action and greater national,
regional and international collaboration," and emphasized "the crucial
and immediate need for a coordinated international response" to such
public health emergencies.101
Second, with all the available and accurate information on the recent
COVID-19 outbreak, as well as robust data and analysis on the interplay
of the pandemic and international security, I contend that the current
pandemic presents a real and quantifiable security risk and as such meets
the threshold criteria to make international securitization appropriate and
legitimate, and accordingly, to conceptualize the pandemic as a threat to
international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the
UN Charter. This is even more so in the present context, as considerable
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. S.C. Res. 2177, at 2 (Sept. 18, 2014).
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time has passed since the disease outbreak in Wuhan, China, in December
2019 and its subsequent rapid spread to other countries, regions, and
continents.
A. Seriousness and Scale of the COVID-19 Pandemic
The new coronavirus pandemic has been described as "the most
challenging crisis . .. since the Second World War."1 02 It is, without a
doubt, the greatest public health emergency of our times. While all the
potential new impacts of the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus are not yet entirely
known, the pathogen has thus far been shown to have significant
international security implications. Following an increase in cases outside
China, the WHO declared the outbreak a PHEIC on January 30, 2020,
citing the alarming levels of spread and severity as reasons, particularly
affecting countries without robust healthcare systems. Subsequent to this
legally significant decision, the WHO declared the coronavirus outbreak
a pandemic on March 11, 2020.103 The declaration of the COVID-19
pandemic as a PHEIC was renewed on April 30, 2020.104
Due to the rapid spread of the virus, the humanitarian, human security,
and health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic can hardly be
overestimated. As I write, COVID-19 has spread to over 213 countries
and territories across six continents (with Antarctica still being the only
continent with no confirmed cases of the new coronavirus). The virus has
infected more than 13 million people worldwide, already claiming more
than half a million lives. 10 5 Despite its seemingly lower mortality rate
when compared to both Ebola and SARS as similarly serious diseases,
the high number of COVID-19 infections already resulted in a much
higher number of eventual deaths. By way of comparison, a total of
28,652 confirmed cases and 11,325 deaths were reported in the case of
the Ebola outbreak (which remained mostly limited to West Africa) 106
102. Ant6nio Guterres, U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at the Meeting on the Report on
the Socio-Economic Impacts of COVID-19 (Mar. 31, 2020) (transcript available at
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2020-03-31/transcript-of-un-secretary-general
%E2 %80%9 9 s-virtual-press-encounter-launch-the-report-the-socio-economic-impacts-of-covid19 [https://perma.cc/48SA-GJQL]).
103. Charles Clift, Coronavirus: Public Health Emergency or Pandemic - Does Timing
Matter? (May 1, 2020), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/coronavirus-public-healthemergency-or-pandemic-does-timing-matter [https://perma.cc/9Z5F-PJCR].
104. World Health Organization, Listings of WHO's response to COVID-19, (June 29, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline [https://perma.cc/4RD8-NRFF].

105.

COVID-19

Pandemic,

EUR.

CTR.

FOR

https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/covid-19-pandemic

DISEASE

PREVENTION

AND

CONTROL,

[https://perma.cc/PWH3-F3QY] (last visited

July 14, 2020).
106. 2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html

[https://

perma.cc/E8YB-2TTC] (last visited July 15, 2020).
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and during the period of SARS infection, over 8,000 people from 29
07
different countries and territories were infected, and at least 774 died.1
Just by looking at this official statistical data, one can safely say that
COVID-19 poses a formidable threat to human life. Moreover, the extent
of the catastrophe caused by a pandemic can be measured not only in
human terms, but also in the fear and panic it instills in those it affects.
The mental health and wellbeing of whole societies have been severely
impacted by this crisis. Research on both past outbreaks of infectious
diseases and the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the widespread
negative impact of epidemics on individuals' mental health and
wellbeing.1 08 The overwhelming psychological distress in COVID-19
affected populations is evidenced in national surveys conducted thus
far.1 09 Indeed, "[t]he long-term impact of the [COVID-19 emergency] on
0
people's mental health .. . should not be overlooked.""
Both the speed and the magnitude of the COVID-19 disease spread
rightfully suggests factors favoring its designation as a threat to
international peace and security. " Some members of the UNSC
portrayed COVID-19 as a threat to international peace and security by
drawing on notions that reflect conceptions of human security. For
example, the representative of the Dominican Republic in the UNSC,
Ambassador Jose Singe, stated that "the potential and unprecedented
magnitude of the COVID-19 outbreak globally constitutes a threat to
107. Summary of ProbableSARS Cases with Onset of Illness from I November4 2002 to 31
July 2003, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table200 _04_21/en/
[https://perma.cc/SQ77-F45S] (last visited July 15, 2020).

108. See Paul S.F. Yip et al., The Impact of Epidemic Outbreak: The Case of Severe Acute
86
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Suicide Among Older Adults in Hong Kong, 31 CRISIS
BULL.
72
Outbreak,
Ebola
the
of
Perils
Unseen
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factor:
(2010); James M. Shultz et al., Fear
OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 304-10 (2016); Hector W.H. Tsang et al., Psychosocial Impact of

SARS, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1326 (2004); Hacer Belen, Fear of COVID-19 and
Mental Health: The Role of Mindfulness in During Time of Crisis, RSCH. SQUARE (July 7, 2020),

4 5 29
/v1 [https://perma.cc/6JTA-7ZC6].
https://www.researchsquare.com/article/rs- 0
al., The Distress of Iranian Adults During the
et
Jahanshahi
Afshar
Asghar
e.g.,
109. See,
Covid-19 Pandemic- More Distressedthan the Chinese and with Different Predictors,87 BRAIN,
BEHAV., AND IMMUNITY 124 (2020); Jianyin Qiu et al., A Nationwide Survey of Psychological
Distress Among Chinese People in the COVID-19 Epidemic: Implications and Policy
Recommendations, 33 GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1 (2020); Nirmita Panchal et al., The Implications of
COVID-19 for Mental Health and Substance Use, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 21, 2020),

https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/the-implications-of-covid-

19-for-mental-

health-and-substance-use/ [https://perma.cc/WKB7-MTTN].
110. U.N. Policy Brief: COVID-19 and the Need for Action on Mental Health, 7 (May
13, 2020), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un_policy-brief-covidand_mentalhealth_

final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EQJ-3B2K].
111. Marko Svicevic, COVID-19 as a Threat to InternationalPeace and Security: What
Place for the UN Security Council?, EUR. J. INT'L L. BLOG (EJIL:TALK!) (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid- 9-as-a-threat-to-international-peace-and-security-what-place-for
-the-un-security-council/ [https://perma.cc/LXK5-FE89].
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international peace and security and could critically harm human security
across the world."" 2
Economic, social, and political stability in COVID-19 affected
countries and regions also continue to be of real international security
concern. In the words of Peter Maurer, President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), COVID-19 "is deepening fragility,
spiking humanitarian needs, accentuating the impact of violence, opening
the doors to 'alarming' levels of stigmatization and reversing
development gains."' '3 UNSC Resolution 2532 (2020) recognized this
reality by stating that conditions of violence and instability in conflict and
post-conflict situations can exacerbate the pandemic, and vice versa.1 1 4
By linking the (potential) COVID-19 pandemic implications to the
post-conflict situations, the prospect of new incidents of violence and
conflicts because of the disease's effects over the stability of the affected
countries, the situations in armed conflict-affected countries, or those
affected by humanitarian crises, the UNSC followed the traditional (and
fairly uncontroversial) way of rationalizing its pronouncement on the
issue and legitimizing its engagement under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.
All things considered, there is an obvious interconnection between
state security, human security, and international peace and security in the
present case. More specifically, the threatened harm to international and
human security is sufficiently clear, quantifiable and serious, to justify
prima facie qualification of the COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to
international peace and security. Both state security (in terms of armed
conflict prospects as well as existing humanitarian crises in the conflict
areas) and human security have been threatened to a high enough level to
make such a determination by the UNSC normatively justified and
legitimate.
B. Proper Purpose of the UNSC's Action
The underlying purpose that the characterization by the UNSC of the
COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to international peace and security would
serve is twofold: (1) to curb, control, and diminish to the extent possible
the threat posed by the pandemic, with a particular emphasis on countries
in need, including those in situations of armed conflict or affected by
humanitarian crises; and (2) to call for a range of concrete measures and
actions by states to minimize the disproportionate negative impact of the
pandemic, "notably the socio-economic impact, on vulnerable population
112. Press Release, Security Council, COVID-19 'Profoundly Affecting Peace across the
Globe', Says Secretary-General, in Address to Security Council, U.N. Press Release SC/14241

(July 2, 2020).
113. Id.

114. S.C. Res. 2532, at 1 (July 1, 2020).
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groups, including women and girls, children, refugees, internally
5
displaced persons, older persons and persons with disabilities."" This
main purpose of taking up the issue of COVID-19 and designating it a
possible threat to international peace and security is also reflected in
UNSC Resolution 2532 (2020).1 6
C. The UNSC's Action as the Last Resort
Needless to say, the UNSC has been uniquely positioned to address
such a complex crisis as a global pandemic. Its pronouncement of the
COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to international peace and security would
enable the UNSC to appeal to a broad range of actors and resources and
call for a number of concrete and operational measures for effective
international cooperation in countering the global pandemic. In this way,
the UNSC would serve as a principal forum to converge multilateral
efforts to. address this unprecedented and unpredicted global threat. As
the time passed and the crisis developed, it became increasingly evident
that the UNSC's action was a must.
Other measures such as the two COVID-19-related resolutions
adopted by the UNGA (Resolutions 74/270 and 74/274)"17 did not go
much farther than being statements of joint, good intentions. For
example, the latter resolution on the issue of access to vaccines,
medicines and medical equipment to face COVID-19 does not contain
any call or recommendation for member states to engage in international
cooperation, including on the implementation of measures and
1 8
regulations adopted by the WHO. 1 Consequently, these other measures
proved to be of only little, if any, effect on the ground.
D. The UNSC's Intervention as a ProportionalMeans
It is moreover obvious that designating the COVID-19 pandemic a
threat to international peace and security and, in this context,
recommending appropriate measures or, if necessary, declaring legally
binding (non-military) measures of enforcement would be proportionate
to the seriousness and scale of this global threat. UNSC Resolution 2532
(2020) demands a general and immediate cessation of hostilities in all
situations on the UNSC's agenda and highlights the enhanced need for
solidarity and cooperation on the national, regional, and international
levels in countering this pandemic. More particularly, the resolution
"calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to engage immediately in a

Id. at 2.
See id.
See G.A. Res. 74/270 (Apr. 2, 2020); G.A. Res. 74/274 (Apr. 20, 2020).
G.A. Res. 74/274 (Apr. 20, 2020); See Raymundo T. Treves, The Health of
InternationalCooperationand UNGA Resolution 74/274, 70 QUESTIONS INT'L L. 21 (2020).
115.
116.
117.
118.
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durable humanitarian pause for at least 90 consecutive days, to enable the
safe, unhindered and sustained delivery of humanitarian assistance" and
provision of related services. The aim of such a pause is to allow for
medical evacuations, in accordance with international law, "including
international humanitarian and refugee law as applicable." 19
However, the cessation of hostilities and the humanitarian pause "do
not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), Al Qaida and Al Nusra Front
(ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
associated with Al Qaida or ISIL," and other UNSC-designated terrorist
groups. 120 Resolution 2532 also calls for states' concrete actions to
mitigate the disproportionately negative socio-economic impact of the
pandemic on the most vulnerable sectors of society so that they "ensure
the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and youth" in their
COVID-19 response efforts through 'the "development and
implementation of an adequate and sustainable
response to the
pandemic." 121 All these non-binding recommendations and measures
cannot be considered excessive compared to the enormous danger
threatening international peace and security.
E. Reasonableness of the UNSC's Intervention and Balance of
Consequences
In a case of such a huge and global threat as is the COVID-19
pandemic, it is of course more appropriate for the UNSC to pronounce on
the issue, preferably declaring it a threat to international peace and
security, and act accordingly. Treating the global pandemic merely as a
potential threat or not even taking up the issue as an international security
matter may result in much worse immediate and long-term consequences.
In such situations, it is also sensible to expect that implementation of
UNSC's recommendations or enforcement measures not involving the
use of armed force by the member states will ensure more successful
coping with the pandemic's implications.
F. The Needfor a Joint International Action and Regional Mobilization
As far as the COVID-19 pandemic is concerned, the UNSC seems to
be the organ of the UN which is best placed to facilitate a coordinated
and common international response to a global threat that knows no
borders. Unlike its resolution on the 2014 Ebola virus outbreak in some
countries in West Africa, with which the UNSC for the first time
considered an infectious disease outbreak a threat to international peace
119. S.C. Res. 2532, 1 (July 1, 2020).
120. Id.
121. Id ¶7.
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and security, Resolution 2532 (2020) does not mention the critical role of
the WHO.1 22 Nor does it urge member states to implement the temporary
recommendations issued by the WHO Director-General on January 30,
23
2020, and April 30, 2020, as Resolution 2177 (2014) did.1
Resolution 2532 is also silent on other relevant issues such as national
and regional mobilization of capabilities in facing the COVID-19
pandemic, the continuing exchange of expertise, lessons learned and best
practices, or the provision of urgent resources and assistance, including
deployable medical capabilities, laboratory services, dedicated clinical
services, and technical expertise. In that respect, it does not follow in the
footsteps of its preceding resolution on Ebola which explicitly urged
"member states, as well as bilateral partners and multilateral
organizations, including the AU, ECOWAS, and European Union, to
mobilize." 124 The preceding resolution further urged members and
partners to provide immediately to the affected countries and
implementing partners essential resources, supplies, coordinated
assistance, technical expertise, and additional medical capacity, including
for rapid diagnosis and training of health workers at the national and
25
international level.'
The above analysis of the UNSC's response to the COVID-19 crisis
in light of the suggested threshold criteria for qualifying the global
pandemic as a threat to international peace and security has shown that
these criteria were fully met. However, the UNSC's approach was
indecisive, feeble and, above all, painfully slow because of procedural
and substantive difficulties it faced. The UNSC's inability to act promptly
and effectively in response to this global threat has renewed calls for UN
reform.' 2 6
There are, of course, other intricate and related legal questions that
merit closer examination. For example, as Anna Hood asked when it
came to Ebola, "what effect does the declaration that [the pandemic] is a
threat to the peace have for art 41 of the UN Charter and how well
27
equipped is the Council to address health-related matters?"1 Moreover,
122. Compare S.C. Res. 2177,3 (Sept. 18, 2014) (mentioning WHO involvement), with S.C.
Res. 2532 (July 1, 2020) (failing to mention the role of the WHO).
123. CompareS.C. Res. 2177, 5 (Sept. 18, 2014) (requesting implementation of International
Health Regulations), with S.C. Res. 2532 (July 1, 2020) (failing to mention the role of the WHO).

states
124. Compare S.C. Res. 2177, 4 (Sept. 18, 2014) (requesting mobilization of member

and
among others), with S.C. Res. 2532 (July 1, 2020) (failing to urge mobilization of local
desease related
regional states and organizations in reguard to exchange of resources and certain
information).

125. S.C. Res. 2177, 4-5 (Sept. 18, 2014).
126. Enrico Milano & Giulio Bartolini, COVID-19 and Multilateral Governance at the
United Nations between Risk-Prevention, Procedural Adaptation and Feeble Response, 70
QUESTIONS INT'L L. 1, 3 (2020).
127. See Hood, supra note 9, at n.11.
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an important jurisdictional question pertaining to the delicate balance of
powers between the UN's two principal organs (UNSC and UNGA)
arises: is the UNGA, in public health emergency situations like this onewhen permanent five members of the UNSC are unable to achieve
unanimity in addressing threats to international peace and security in a
timely manner-entitled to take authority into its hands by invoking its
Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950? 128 Can provisions of the UN
Charter be interpreted to give the UNGA such powers in the present
context? If so, what character (legal or political) and weight is to be
ascribed to both UNGA resolutions dedicated to the issue of COVID-19
pandemic, given that they preceded the UNSC Resolution 2532 (2020)?
These questions, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
IV.

UNSC RESOLUTION 2532 (2020)

AND ITS IMPLICATIONS: BETTER
LATE THAN NEVER?

UNSC Resolution 2532 (2020) marks the third time that the UNSC
has dealt directly with a public health problem-the first two being with
regard to HIV/AIDS and Ebola. 129 With its, in my view, "long overdue"
resolution on cessation of hostilities during the COVID-19 pandemic, the
UNSC, perhaps surprisingly, did not characterize this global pandemic as
a threat to international peace and security. However, it did consider that
it has the potential to become such a threat, by stating that "the
unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security."' 30
As in previous cases of UNSC resolutions dealing with infectious
diseases, there is no elaboration of the normative or factual basis for that
consideration except that it seems to be linked to the risk of the pandemic
outbreak exacerbating the adverse humanitarian impact of conflict
situations in conflict-affected countries and reversing the peacebuilding
and development gains of countries in transition and post-conflict
countries.' 3 1
For our further discussion, it is useful to briefly outline the sequence
of the major events that led to the adoption of the relevant resolution by
the UNSC. In late March 2020, the UN Secretary-General issued a call
for a global ceasefire because of the COVID-19 outbreak. 132 In early
128. See G.A. Res. 5/377, ¶ 1 (Nov. 3, 1950).
129. See S.C. Res. 1308 (July 17, 2000) (dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic); S.C. Res.
2177 (Sept. 18, 2014) (dealing with the Ebola outbreak in West Africa); S.C. Res. 2532 (July 1,
2020) (dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic).
130. S.C. Res. 2532, 1 (July 1, 2020).
131. Id.
132. Ant6nio Guterres, U.N. Secretary-General, Appeal for Global Ceasefire (Mar. 23,

2020),

(transcript

available

at

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-03-23/

secretary-generals-appeal-for-global-ceasefire [https://perma.cc/Z9SS-6XNQ].
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April 2020, he delivered a detailed update, underlining that while parties
had expressed their acceptance for his call for a global ceasefire, there
were challenges to making ceasefires a reality and "robust diplomacy"
33
was needed. 1
In his subsequent remarks to the UNSC on the COVID-19 pandemic,
the UN Secretary-General stressed that "the pandemic also poses a
significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and securitypotentially leading to an increase in social unrest and violence." 1
Moreover, he highlighted the crucial role of the UNSC's engagement in
mitigating the international peace and security implications of the
COVID-19 pandemic.1 3 5 Requesting "a signal of unity and resolve" from
the UNSC, he pointed to a much-needed "marshalling of the international
community's response to the international security implications" of the
COVID-19 crisis, just like the UNSC did by fully engaging itself in the
13 6
cases of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the Ebola outbreak.
It then took another three months for the members of the UNSC to
finally agree on a statement on the matter. The UNSC unanimously
adopted the resolution in a virtual meeting, after having considered all the
collected and reliable information on the coronavirus and its effects,
37
including the UN Secretary-General's briefs and reports.1 In the light of
133. Ant6nio Guterres, U.N. Secretary-General, Press briefing to update on his Appeal for

A Global Ceasefire following the Outbreak of Coronavirus (COVID-19) (Apr. 3, 02020),
3
4
available

at

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2020-

-0

/

(transcript

secretary-generals-press-briefing-update-his-appeal-for-global-ceasefire-following-the-outbreak
-of-coronavirus-%28covid-19%29 [https://permacc/VN9F-3DCF].

134. Ant6nio Guterres, U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Security Council on the
COVID-19 Pandemic (Apr. 9, 2020), (transcript available at https://www.un.org/sg/en/
9-the-covid-9content/sg/statement/2020-04-09/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-counci
pandemic-delivered [https://permacc/V54P-BJGN].

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Resolution 2532 (2020) was adopted 111 days after the WHO declared COVID-19 to
be a global pandemic. One may wonder why it had taken such a long time before the UNSC
adopted a single resolution on the matter. At least two reasons for a belated response of the UNSC

can be identified. The first is of a procedural nature. It is obvious that the UNSC also was
unprepared to grapple with the extraordinary circumstances that did not allow for meeting inbusiness
person. It thus struggled for quite some time with an internal challenge: how to ensure
continuity despite the closure of in-person meetings at its Headquarters in New York. In the face

of this lockdown, it had to deal with a profound disruption of ordinary working methods and

procedural rules and adapt them to the new reality. As a result, the UNSC has developed the

practice of meeting virtually through a UN-developed video conferencing system and has
established an unprecedented practice of voting in written form. The second and more substantive
reason for the UNSC's delayed response was a protracted and heated controversy between China

and the United States over the role of the WHO in this crisis and over language on the origins of
the virus, which made it impossible to reach the necessary agreement within the UNSC sooner.
The voting procedure for the draft resolution (drafted by France and Tunisia) was launched on
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this development, any fear that such a determination/pronouncement by
the UNSC may be premature or disproportionate to the major health
security threat that the COVID-19 pandemic currently poses to the
international community is out of place. Hence, the collective decision of
the UNSC members not to accept the UN Secretary-General's suggestion
to designate the coronavirus pandemic as a threat to international peace
and security seems inappropriate, if not incomprehensible.1 38
In its content, Resolution 2532 is limited to support for a global
ceasefire, thus implying that the UNSC was unable to come up with a
broadened resolution that would fully address the need for renewed
member state commitment to transparency and accountability in the
context of COVID-19. Nor does the resolution contain any clause calling
for the lifting or suspension of economic sanctions that affected the
delivery of medical supplies in the countries targeted by such
sanctions. 139

For the most part, the operative part of the resolution demands a
cessation of hostilities from the parties to armed conflicts and calls for
intensified international cooperation to tackle the pandemic. 4 0 The idea
of a global ceasefire and "immediate 90-day humanitarian pause" in
armed conflict areas throughout the world explicitly endorsed by UNSC
Resolution 2532 is indeed unprecedented.14 1 The resolution also requests
the UN Secretary-General to provide routine updates to the UNSC on

June 30, 2020, and concluded on July 1, 2020, in accordance with the special written procedure
agreed to by the UNSC members. The final resolution makes no mention (not even an indirect
one) of the WHO which was a bone of contention during lengthy negotiations on the text, notably
between China and the United States. For all the challenges of working via video teleconferences,
the UNSC members, and especially the permanent members, can nonetheless be criticized for
"their inability or unwillingness to set up an emergency mechanism for a body that is supposed to
meet regularly and continuously in order to accomplish its duties as the UN main organ with
primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security." Giuseppe Nesi,
The United Nations Principal Political Organs and the Universal Pandemic: How to Meet,
Negotiate and Deliberate Under 'New, Extraordinary and Exceptional Circumstances'?, 70
QUESTIONS INT'L

L. 5, 20 (2020).

138. It might have been that China's intransigent resistance to designate in the UNSC the
COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to international peace and security prevented any such
determination. We can only speculate on the reasons for such a strategic formulation that carefully
excluded certain associations to any state, but it seems that this corresponds to the widest possible
consensus that the UNSC members were able to reach on this issue.
139. The Russian mission to the UNSC signaled that it wanted a clause in the resolution
addressing the issue of economic sanctions. However, this appeal largely fell on the deaf ears of
other UNSC members, in particular, the United States. See Julian Borger, US Blocks Vote on UN's
Bid for Global Ceasefire Over Reference to WHO, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/08/un-ceasefire-resolution-us-blocks-who
[https://
perma.cc/GRX6-2NUX].

140. S.C. Res. 2532, ¶ 5 (July 1, 2020).
141. Id. at ¶2.
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cease-fire implementation progress in conflict-affected and fragile
states.1

42

It is perhaps too early to assess the normative value and real impact of
the UNSC resolution on tackling the COVID-19 pandemic. Some UN
experts have been rather skeptical about any potential impact of UNSC
Resolution 2532, finding its adoption coming too late and its immediate
43
effect too little to bring about positive changes on the ground.1 Others
have considered the resolution to be "more of a face-saving measure for
the Council than a signal of renewed international resolve."144 Had the
UNSC responded with greater resolve at the beginning of the crisis, when
international concern about the coronavirus was at its peak, it might have
more fundamentally altered the calculations of warring parties and
signaled stronger international unity and cooperation to back up demands
with prompt and coordinated action. 145 While the representatives and
ambassadors of the member states in the UNSC as well as some other
diplomats hailed the unanimous adoption of the resolution as a
meaningful victory for multilateralism, it is questionable whether such a
resolution coming months after the global spread of the pandemic will
46
help bring international peace and security.1
With its rather pragmatic provisions, Resolution 2532 may prove to
be of great practical value, in the sense that it may "further empower
mediators and bolster humanitarian assistance efforts as COVID-19 cases
147 First, it provides
rise in a number of the world's worst conflict zones."
for an urgent, achievable, and time-limited goal by giving mediators "an
urgent, yet achievable, impetus for parties to temporarily pause offensive
operations." 14 Second, it subjects belligerents to international scrutiny
through creating a monitoring framework for documenting its worst
abusers and regularly providing updated data to the UNSC on the
progress of cease-fire implementation. 149 Given the right political
pressure, such a control mechanism "may deter both state and non-state
actors from resuming violence." 150 Third, the resolution may help
provide new or additional openings for critically needed humanitarian

142. Id. at 15.

2532
143. Maurizio Arcari, Some thoughts in the aftermath of Security Council Resolution
(2020) on Covid-19, 70 QUESTIONS INT'L L. 59, 73 (2020).

144. Tyler Beckelman & Amanda Long, U.N. Finally Endorses a COVID Cease-fire: Will it

Make a Difference?, U.S. INST. PEACE (July 8, 2020), https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/

07/un-finally-endorses-covid-cease-fire-will-it-make-difference [https://perma.cc/Q49C-J2E5].
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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assistance to address exacerbating conditions in the world's worst armed

conflicts.151
The odds are also that, by adopting another resolution on the matter in
the near future with a higher degree of its substantive involvement, the
UNSC will reclassify the COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to international
peace and security. Should this happen, the UNSC will be able to
affirmatively act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and take any
enforcement action it deems necessary and appropriate to maintain or
restore international peace and security. However, in such a case, the
UNSC will most likely not determine any enforcement measures, unless
there is a political target whose behavior is to be changed through
coercion.
Yet, the use of Article 39 language for the COVID-19 pandemic
would carry important symbolic and political weight, thus generating
"momentum and additional political, operational and financial
commitments by the international community." 5 2 For example, during
the Ebola crisis in 2014, the UNSC managed to swiftly pass its
Resolution 2177 "calling the virus a 'threat to international peace and
security,' which inspired other nations to drum up their support in a
powerful display of solidarity.""'
It remains to be seen what the resolution will actually achieve, but had
it immediately followed the UN Secretary-General's plea in March 2020
and designated the COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to international peace
and security, it would have gained more traction. It is also worth noting
that the adoption of this resolution is of high symbolic value. It has proved
that should there be good political will and maturity, the UNSC members
can go beyond their divergent views, prioritize the broader interests of
the international community and convey a message of unity. In any event,
the success or failure of Resolution 2532 in terms of its prompt and
effective implementation by the UN member states "will depend on the
extent to which member states use their diplomatic capital to make it a
reality."1 54
CONCLUSION

Where does the foregoing analysis of the UNSC's practice lead us in
terms of its proper role in addressing public health emergencies and
considering infectious disease outbreaks as threats to international peace
and security? So far, its treatment of "non-traditional" threats to
international peace and security, including infectious disease outbreaks,
has been neither coherent nor settled. In previous cases of epidemic
151. Beckelman & Long, supra note 144.
152. Burci & Quirin, supra note 58, at 29.
153. Beckelman & Long, supra note 144.

154. Id.
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outbreaks, including the global COVID-19 pandemic, the UNSC's
responses were usually too slow and too inefficient to effectively combat
the infectious diseases. This is mainly because construing a public health
emergency as a matter of international security brings into play a threatdefense logic, which often complicates the international political
environment and negotiations around a public health issue and entangles
55
them with a wider set of international political disputes.1
On the other hand, however, it is also true that the narrative of public
health emergency as an international security issue in the UNSC and its
direct involvement in the most serious cases of infectious diseases
outbreak may generate much political traction by raising the political
profile of the public health situation at hand. As Gian Luca Burci has
suggested, the intervention of the UNSC through declaring a public
health event a threat to international peace and security may also
incentivize and step up political commitments by the UN member states,
mobilize additional financial and human resources and facilitate "the
deployment of military assets with the required logistical, organizational
56
and enforcement capacity."'
What criteria, then, may qualify a public health emergency as a threat
to international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter?
This contribution has argued that in securitizing public health
emergencies, the UNSC should appeal to objective criteria, such as those
discussed above, to rationalize, normatively justify, and legitimize its
determinations of threats to international peace and security. It has also
examined the normative bases for such UNSC determinations, most
notably the nature, scale, and seriousness of a public health emergency.
While the UNSC will not normally deem the spread of the disease to be
an international peace and security issue, it may nevertheless find it
reasonable and necessary to treat it as such in certain serious cases under
the conditions discussed above. In that respect, the article has claimed
that any public health emergency that leads to large-scale death or
lessening of life chances and undermines the social, political, and
economic bases for stability of states as the basic units of the international
system amounts to a threat to international peace and security, and should
be considered as such by the UNSC.
By providing operative criteria for qualifying an infectious disease
outbreak as a threat to international peace and security and applying such
criteria to the COVID-19 case study, this Article has moreover illustrated
how the UNSC can legitimately become the pre-eminent guardian of
global public health. Within a "broader and broadening notion" of "a
threat to international peace and security" which may legitimately
155. See Stefan Elbe, Haggling over Viruses: The Downside Risks ofSecuritizing Infectious
Disease, 25 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 476, 483 (2010).
156. Burci & Quirin, supra note 58, at 39.
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encompass large-scale and extreme public health threats such as the
COVID-19 outbreak, the "role of the [UNSC] should be limited to
situations," matters, and issues "whose potential or actual security
implications are assessed on the basis of a more holistic" and rigorous
analysis (including the consideration of the qualifying criteria proposed
here) "rather than conclusions that are predicated on unqualified or
anecdotal assumptions."' 57 "Such an analysis could be provided by the
UN Secretariat in collaboration with other relevant international
organizations including WHO."1 58
Finally, has the UNSC, by not addressing the COVID-19 pandemic as
an international security issue in a timely manner and not qualifying it as
a threat to international peace and security, failed to exercise its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security?
Having analyzed the way and substance of the UNSC's response to the
COVID-19 pandemic against the objective criteria proposed herein, it is
possible to conclude that the main political organ of the UN did not
properly fulfill its mandate as regards this global security threat for two
obvious reasons: (1) its response was far too slow; and more importantly,
(2) it failed to determine that the global pandemic constitutes a threat to
international peace and security. By not responding with urgency andfrom the heart, the UNSC has missed the early window of opportunity to
give substantial political weight to the UN Secretary-General's call for a
global ceasefire.

157. Id.
158. Id.
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